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Identifying Factors that Influence Terrorist
Decisions and Target Selection
Barry C. Ezell, Joshua Behr, and Andrew Collins
Abstract
Currently, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) elicits probabilistic judgments
from the intelligence community on actions terrorists may take to attack the continental U.S. For
example, how likely is the adversary to choose agent ‘x’ over agent ‘y’ or target ‘a’ over target
‘b’? Eliciting these types of judgments is difficult and time consuming. The National Academies
and others have suggested that a better approach may be to elicit information on adversary’s
preferences, perceptions, and capabilities and use this information to calculate probabilities of
interest to DHS. Some terrorist groups are thinking about using weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), each with its own values, perceptions of reality, and capabilities. This presentation details
the findings on the factors & relationships among factors that lead to a terrorist decision to initiate
an attack against the continental U.S as well as target selection. To accomplish this, we assembled
international experts in WMD, adversary modeling, political science, terrorism, psychiatry, social
sciences as well as experts from national laboratories, the Commonwealth of Virginia State Fusion
Center, and Hampton Roads Emergency Management.
This paper provides a summary of the findings from an Adaptive Adversary Workshop. In
this paper, we provide an overview of the motivation for and design of the workshop as well as 19
emerging themes. The purpose of the workshop was to illicit expert opinions on terrorist decision-
making and target selections in an effort to improve our understanding of adversaries (individuals,
local/regional groups, transnational groups, states) who may initiate a bioterrorism attack in the
form of releasing biological agents upon U.S. interests. Furthermore, these expert opinions are
intended to be used to inform Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) models of terrorist networks. These
models must be informed or populated with substantive information about the intelligent and
adaptive adversary who may initiate an attack. To this end, a conceptual framework, informed
broadly by the social sciences community, is intended to capture the terrorists’ motivations,
methods, and decision calculi.
KEYWORDS: Adaptive Adversary Factors, terrorism, terrorist decisions
Author Notes: This work was funded in part by the Battelle National Biodefense Institue Contract
# 792981.
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Currently, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) elicits probabilistic 
judgments from the intelligence community on actions that terrorists may take to 
attack the continental United States (CONUS). For example, how likely is the 
adversary (terrorist) to choose agent X over agent Y or target A over target B? But 
eliciting such judgments is difficult and time-consuming. Some terrorist groups 
are thinking about using weapons of mass destruction (WMD), each group having 
its own values, perceptions of reality, and capabilities. The National Academies 
and others have suggested that a better approach might be to elicit information on 
the adversary’s values, perceptions, and capabilities and use that information to 
calculate probabilities of interest to DHS. 
 
Adaptive Adversary Workshop 
 
The Adaptive Adversary Workshop was a one-day workshop focused on 
determining the factors that lead to a terrorist decision to initiate an attack against 
CONUS as well as to the selection of targets. To this end, we assembled 
international experts in WMD, adversary modeling, political science, terrorism, 
psychiatry, and social sciences; professionals from local law enforcement, the DHS 
Office of Risk Management, the Commonwealth of Virginia State Fusion Center, 
Hampton Roads Emergency Management, and the Hampton Roads Planning 
District Commission; and experts from the Sandia National Laboratories. These 
experts included Dr. Jessica Stern of the Hoover Institution's Task Force on 
National Security and Law, who also served on President Bill Clinton's National 
Security Council staff in 1994–1995; Dr. Ian Lustick, professor of political science 
at the University of Pennsylvania, who has written and edited more than twenty 
books on terrorism-related issues; Dr. John Lathrop of Strategic Insights, whose 
research focuses on counterterrorism and risk management accounting for the 
adaptive adversary; and Mr. George Gabriel, manager for security, preparedness, 
and emergency management for Whitney Bradley and Brown Inc., who recently 
authored the terrorism response plan for the city of Newport News, Virginia. 
The invited participants were given the opportunity to make presentations 
based on their own research and experience on the subject of terrorism. They were 
then asked to engage in three moderated discussion-based sessions addressing 
factors influencing terrorist attack decisions, target selections, and prevailing 
taxonomies. Other invited participants were encouraged to ask questions and 
provide input via a live streaming blog during the discussions. These discussions 
were captured and data were collected via audio recording, written transcript, and 
data collector notes. 
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Emerging Themes 
Findings covered nineteen themes ranging from individual motivations to group 
dynamics, U.S. response strategies, undisclosed terrorist motivations, and 
modeling methodologies. These themes are shown in the table below. 
 
 Title Description 
1 Threat Shifting: 
Shell Game or 
Not? 
Terrorists do in fact respond to countermeasures. An increase in 
vigilance and security at a venue decreases the likelihood of an 
attack at that venue. Although it is recognized that the threat may 
shift to other targets, target hardening still has the effect of reducing 
targets and decreasing the overall probability of an attack.  
2 Two Cultures 
(Modelers and the 
Intel Community) 
 
The challenge is to understand the terrorists’ objectives so that their 
decision-making processes may be modeled. To do this, modelers 
need to closely collaborate with experts within the intelligence 
community to gain a better understanding of the objectives of the 
radial Islamists, their hierarchy, etc. The important point is that we 
don’t build models first and elicit the opinions of experts afterward. 
We need to start with the narratives of terrorist processes and then 
fit our tools to that. Unfortunately, the connection between the 
expert intelligence and tool fitting has not yet been made. 




Terrorism is not an individual, isolated person or attack but rather 
an enterprise with leadership. Therefore, organized terrorism can be 
approached in much the same manner as organized crime. With 
such an approach it is imperative to focus on and understand the 
hierarchal structure of the organization, not the motivations of the 
individual. Debilitating the overall structure of the organization 




Exportation of terrorism gives us opportunities to monitor terrorist 
travel and communications, but this is not the case with the HGVE. 
We are now seeing the radicalized homegrown terrorist; less 
controllable by an organization, this type of radical is, by extension, 
less predictable in the size and nature of the act he may commit. 
This unpredictability is exacerbated by a lack of understanding as to 
what motivates the HGVE. 
5 Cover All My 
Bases 
Terrorists are heavily invested in instilling fear and breaking down 
the bonds of trust between society and government, as well as in 
disrupting the economy and forcing states and organizations to 
continue investing heavily in counterterrorism measures. As a 
consequence, we become locked in a fear, blame, and spending 
spiral, underscoring huge discrepancies between our risk 
perceptions and the probability of actual attacks.  
6 Political Violence 
as a Dramatic 
Production 
(Terrorism is 
Theater) with Four 
Solipsistic terrorism: I hit you and I show us; recruiting cast 
members. The objective is not necessarily to kill or harm as many 
Americans as possible but, rather, to inspire recruitment.  
Judo: I hit you, you hit me, but help me hit yourself even harder; 
triggering audience to attack the stage. What the terrorist really 
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 Title Description 
Types of 
Interactions 
wants here is an overreaction, exposing the target to more costs and 
exaggerated threats. The optimal response to this tactic is to 
minimize the effects by not overreacting. 
Ricochet: I hit you, you hit me. 
Classic terrorism: Most advanced; it is rare. We are not there yet; 
essentially, we are going to attack you until you stop. This is what 
the United States did to Japan. 
7 Natural Systems 
Paradigm 
Terrorist organizations exist on a spectrum from accomplishment of 
goals—changing the world, expressing themselves to an 
audience—to maintenance of goals—keeping members, raising 
funds, and taking care of their supports. When organizations shift to 
pure maintenance objectives, they begin to strategically plan attacks 
for the purpose of recruitment. As a consequence they often 
transition into a purely criminal organization. The instrumental goal 
of changing the world thus becomes a marketing strategy. 
8 Terrorism as a 
Mark of Identity 
Individuals are drawn to terrorist organizations for numerous reasons, 
including money, power, and prestige, and often for a sense of 
belonging―an identity with dignity. This identity with dignity is a 
powerful motivation for joining and is often the initial reason. It is 
not until later on that recruits become indoctrinated and adopt the 
ideology of the organization. 
9 Popcorn and the 
Root Cause 
Assume that terrorists are like kernels of popcorn: terrorists are 
constantly looking for when the heat is hottest (e.g., when a state’s 
prestige is on the line during a cease fire); that is when they stage 
an event so that they can get as many kernels to pop as possible. 
Your task should not be to neutralize the kernels that are going to 
pop but rather to turn down the heat so that fewer pop. This 
requires determining root causes and demotivating the organization. 
10 The Golden 
Message 
An important question is whether the effect of a terrorist attack on 
recruitment can be mitigated. The most efficient way to reduce the 
motivation to join a terrorist organization is by managing the 
response. An American response should communicate the golden 
message is that America is resilient. 
11 Scenario Building Scenario building leads to a limitless number of imaginable 
scenarios or possibilities. When someone tells a story and provides 
a lot of detail, the story becomes entrancing, and that threat or 
scenario gets most of the attention and money.  
12 Talk to the 
Adversary 
We should study the adaptive adversary by looking at and talking to 
him. When we start with a logical model, we are really beginning 
with a satanic model of the adversary, but this is different from 
empirical reality. If we focus on the effect of the adversary’s 
resentment on his behavior rather than on the disgust, fear, etc., that 
his behavior generates, we can better understand the adversary’s 
thoughts and beliefs and thus are in a better position to counter 
them.  
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Much can be learned from the conflicts that terrorist organizations 
have with one another. It doesn’t matter if the communications are 
secret; it just matters if the communications are emotionally 
charged. Look at conversation following an event: are the 
participants interested in glorifying a cause or in achieving some 
other goal? We can learn a lot about an organization by paying 
attention to what it is telling its audience; this is called discourse 
analysis. It is how we learn about the constituents: the conversation 
goes back and forth between “we ought to initiate attacks” and “we 
ought to hold back.” 
14 Lone Wolf There are growing numbers of self-motivated and self-educated 
homegrown terrorists who simply feel as though they have been 
slighted and are waging their own personal jihad. Occurrences of 
lone wolf attacks are about 1 in a million. Logically, then, there are 
about 300 of them in the United States. But without any data, the 
lone wolf threat is difficult to assess. Therefore, we ought to look at 
the bottleneck: the ability to focus in on those that have both 
knowledge and access as well as on those who are beginning to 




The objective of the foot operative may be different from the 
strategic objective of the leadership; the organization is 
multilayered and populated by individuals with different, perhaps 
competing, objectives. Thus, when evaluating multiple targets, we 
need to understand that there may be multiple objectives. Those 
potential targets that tend to rise to the top of the pile are those that 
achieve several objectives rather than just one. We can learn about 
some of these objectives by looking at the documents we capture; 
they tell us the types of targets and their values (e.g., The Al Qaeda 
Training Manuel, ed. J. Post). 
16 Bureaucratic 
Competition 
If the United States and the Soviets are competing, there is a game 
between the CIA and KGB that is driven by the petty things of 
concern to individuals—machismo—rather than the bigger strategy 
of national concerns. We might want to think of the competition 
between groups as involving more personal issues as well. Perhaps 
al-Qaeda operatives are motivated by the desire to show us that 
they can do what they do because they’ve done it before. How 
would a model capture that? 
17 Political Violence 
as Demand 
Political violence may be viewed as a demand issue. When people 
become angry, they are more apt to turn to violence. If you can 
make them less angry, the demand goes down and the violence 
goes down. So it is useful to view it also as a supply issue. Violence 
occurs when people can profit by using it. If they want something 
from you, you are in a position where you can negotiate; this can 
then become a political relationship. 
18 Comfort Level as a 
Constraint  
Most criminal organizations have a comfort level in terms of what 
they are capable of and willing to do. Many don’t stray beyond 
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 Title Description 
 their comfort zone. If we harden certain infrastructure, they may 
continue to target the same areas because they are comfortable with 
them. What they are not comfortable with may never make it into 
their playbook.  
19 Mirroring the 
Adversary 
The temptation is to model the adversary as though the adversary is 
shaped like we are: top down and rational. Another alternative is to 
model the adversary in the way it is more convenient for us to 
envision: motivated by blood thirst. The challenge here is not one 





This paper has summarized the findings from an Adaptive Adversary Workshop, 
in which we elicited expert opinions on terrorist decision-making and target 
selections in order to improve our understanding of adversaries (individuals, 
local/regional groups, transnational groups, states) who may initiate a 
bioterrorism attack upon U.S. interests. These expert opinions are being used to 
inform Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) models of terrorist networks, which 
require substantive information about the intelligent and adaptive adversary who 
may initiate an attack. To this end, a conceptual framework, informed broadly by 
the social sciences community, is intended to capture the terrorists’ motivations, 
methods, and decision calculi. 
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